Optimal Tenurial Contracts Under Both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Lionel Thomas () and Christian At
Additional contact information
Lionel Thomas: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]

Post-Print from HAL

Date: 2018-10-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03763708v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2018, 101 (3), pp.941-959. ⟨10.1093/ajae/aay049⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-03763708v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Tenurial Contracts Under Both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03763708

DOI: 10.1093/ajae/aay049

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().