The Market for Corporate Control with Influential- and Dependent-Stakeholder Protection

Christian At

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Abstract: This paper investigates how the level of stakeholder protection affects the market for corporate control. Two types of stakeholder protection are distinguished: the influential stakeholders' claims apply to the part of the firm's revenues that is not diverted by the manager as private benefits; the dependent stakeholders obtain a fraction of the firm's revenues once the private benefits have been realized. Stakeholder protection is not irrelevant for the market for corporate control, and its effects on the price paid by the bidder, the success or failure of takeovers, and their frequency depend crucially on the types of stakeholder protection.

Date: 2017
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03764237v1
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Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2017, 173 (3), pp.419-430. ⟨10.1628/093245616X14660658344881⟩

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Journal Article: The Market for Corporate Control with Influential- and Dependent-Stakeholder Protection (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03764237

DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14660658344881

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