Bargaining over crowdfunding benefits

Marco Bade ()
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Marco Bade: TUB - Technical University of Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin

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Abstract: Purpose Crowdfunding creates multifaceted benefits for different agents who all desire to extract some of these benefits. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the allocation of crowdfunding benefits among crowdfunders, entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists. Design/methodology/approach The present paper develops a multi-stage bargaining model with a double-sided moral hazard. Findings It is demonstrated that higher entrepreneurial bargaining power vis-à-vis the crowd may not always be beneficial for the venture. Most importantly, this is due to the reduced success probability of crowdfunding resulting from higher bargaining power of the entrepreneur. Bargaining power and the value of outside options determine the equilibrium allocation of crowdfunding benefits, expected venture value, and thus expected wealth of all agents. Practical implications Entrepreneurs face a tradeoff between venture quality gains and worse outcomes from crowdfunding campaigns. Crowdfunding success and thus venture quality gains are the ultimate goal of policy makers if they aim to enhance the overall social welfare. Originality/value This paper is the first to investigate how multifaceted crowdfunding benefits are allocated between the crowd, entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists. The paper furthers the development of an appropriate regulatory framework for crowdfunding by depicting new and original effects related to crowdfunding.

Date: 2018-05-17
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Published in Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, 2018, 7 (2), pp.166-177. ⟨10.1108/JEPP-D-18-00009⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03781421

DOI: 10.1108/JEPP-D-18-00009

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