Central Bank Credibility, Independence, and Monetary Policy

Abdelkader Aguir ()
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Abdelkader Aguir: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The main motives behind the adoption of an inflation targeting regime largely relate to the notion of credibility, transparency of monetary policy and the autonomy of the central bank, which explicitly undertakes to achieve a certain inflation target. This paper examines the effects of inflation targeting in emerging economies in relation to the degree of independence of the central bank and the credibility of monetary policy. We find effects in emerging economies with little central bank independence, so our findings suggest that the central bank's credibility, transparency and independence is a prerequisite for emerging economies to experience a decline in inflation following the adoption of inflation targeting.

Keywords: Credibility; Transparency; Central bank independence; Inflation targeting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09-01
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Published in Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, 2018, 7 (3), pp.91 - 110. ⟨10.2478/jcbtp-2018-0025⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03791265

DOI: 10.2478/jcbtp-2018-0025

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