Taxes and turnout: when the decisive voter stays at home

Felix Bierbrauer, Aleh Tsyvinski and Nicolas Werquin
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Felix Bierbrauer: Universität zu Köln = University of Cologne
Aleh Tsyvinski: Yale University [New Haven], New Economic School - New Economic School
Nicolas Werquin: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

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Abstract: We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout andendogenous platforms. Parties trade o incentivizing their supporters to voteand discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We showthat the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge inthe political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead tothe adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobi-lize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributivetaxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voterswho are demobilized.

Date: 2022-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in American Economic Review, 2022, 112 (2), pp.689-719. ⟨10.1257/aer.20171927⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03800580

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171927

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