Several liability with sequential care: an experiment

Julien Jacob (), Eve-Angeline Lambert and Emmanuel Peterle
Additional contact information
Julien Jacob: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Emmanuel Peterle: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: By a laboratory experiment, we investigate the incentives of potential tortfeasors to make investments in order to reduce the probability of a given harm occurring. In our experiment, paired players make their decisions sequentially, i.e., a la Stackelberg and in case of a harm, they share liability, either symmetrically or asymmetrically. We vary their level of endowments so that one can become insolvent in case of harm, and show that subjects do not behave as predicted, due to considerations such as inequity aversion or reciprocity. We find that the first-acting tortfeasor does not exploit their advantage fully and invests much more than predicted. Our results also show that the second-acting tortfeasor acts reciprocally with the other, rather than rationally opting for their best response. Finally, we show that asymmetric liability apportionment may restore the incentives to invest for the first tortfeasor, and that insolvency of the second one pushes the first to overinvest in order to avoid harm.

Keywords: Sequential harm; Liability apportionment; Insolvency; Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in European Journal of Law and Economics, 2022, 54 (2), pp.283-326. ⟨10.1007/s10657-022-09740-x⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Several liability with sequential care: an experiment (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03830175

DOI: 10.1007/s10657-022-09740-x

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().