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Waiting for My Neighbors

Sidartha Gordon (), Emeric Henry and Pauli Murto
Additional contact information
Sidartha Gordon: LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres
Pauli Murto: Aalto University

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Abstract: We introduce a neighborhood structure in a waiting game, where the payoff of stopping increases when neighbors stop. We show that the dynamic evolution of the network can take the form of either a shrinking network, where players at the edges stop first, or a fragmenting network where interior players do. In addition to the coordination inefficiency standard in waiting games, the neighborhood structure gives rise to an additional inefficiency linked to the order in which players stop. We discuss an application to technology adoption in networks.

Keywords: Waiting games; Networks; Inefficiencies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-06-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03874202v1
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Published in RAND Journal of Economics, 2021, 52 (2), pp.251-282. ⟨10.1111/1756-2171.12368⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Waiting for my neighbors (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Waiting for My Neighbors (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Waiting for my neighbors (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Waiting for my Neighbors (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Waiting for my Neighbors (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Waiting for my Neighbors (2018) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03874202

DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12368

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