Voting and Contributing when the Group Is Watching

Emeric Henry and Charles Louis-Sidois ()
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Charles Louis-Sidois: University of Mannheim = Universität Mannheim

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Abstract: Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project; in particular, they want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between how members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that making contributions visible affects the calculus of reputation and the voting decisions, and can be welfare decreasing as it makes some rules more likely to be rejected.

Keywords: Image concern; Voting; Public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-08-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03874216v1
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Published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2020, 12 (3), pp.246-276. ⟨10.1257/mic.20180299⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Voting and Contributing When the Group Is Watching (2020)
Working Paper: Voting and Contributing when the Group Is Watching (2020)
Working Paper: Voting and contributing when the group is watching (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03874216

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180299

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