Positional effects in public good provision. Strategic interaction and inertia

Francisco Cabo, Alain Jean-Marie () and Mabel Tidball ()
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Alain Jean-Marie: NEO - Network Engineering and Operations - CRISAM - Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique
Mabel Tidball: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: Consumption satisfaction depends on other factors apart from the inherent characteristic of commodities. Among them, positional concerns are central in behavioral economics. Individuals enjoy returns from the ranking occupied by the consumed item. In public good, agents obtain satisfaction from their relative contribution. We analyze how positional preferences for voluntary contribution to a public good favor players' contributions and could lead to social welfare improvements. A two-player public good game is analyzed, first a one-shot game and later a simple dynamic game with inertia. Homogeneous and non-homogeneous individuals are considered and particular attention is given to the transition path.

Date: 2022-07-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://inria.hal.science/hal-03947632v1
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Published in 19th International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications, Mark Broom, Alberto A. Pinto, Jul 2022, Porto, Portugal

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Working Paper: Positional effects in public good provision. Strategic interaction and inertia (2022)
Working Paper: Positional effects in public good provision. Strategic interaction and inertia (2022)
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