Positional and conformist effects in public good provision. Strategic interaction and inertia

Francisco Cabo, Alain Jean-Marie () and Mabel Tidball
Additional contact information
Alain Jean-Marie: NEO - Network Engineering and Operations - CRISAM - Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique
Mabel Tidball: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Consumption satisfaction depends on other factors apart from the inherent characteristic of commodities. Leibenstein (1950) studies how the consumer's demand reacts to other factors different from the inherent characteristic of a specific commodity. In particular, he highlights the desire of some consumers to be "in style", and the attempt by other for exclusiveness. The desire of some people to conform with the others, to be fashionable or stylish provokes a "bandwagon effect": the demand for a commodity increases due to the fact that others are consuming this same commodity. Conversely, the desire of some other people to be exclusive, or different from the "common hence" provokes the "snob" effect: the demand for a commodity decreases due to the fact that others are consuming it. This paper analyzes positional concerns and conformism in a model of private contributions to public good. A positional consumer gets joy when his/her relative contribution to the public good is higher than the average contribution by others. A conformist consumers feels better if his behavior fits the average behavior in society, i.e., near the average contribution by others. The well-being of a conformist consumer decreases both when his contribution is above or below the average contribution by others. We analyze how positional preferences and conformism for voluntary contributions to a public good favor players' contributions and under which conditions can lead to social welfare improvements. A two-player public good game between a positional and a conformist is analyzed, first in a one-shot game and later in a simple dynamic game with inertia, placing particular attention to the transition path. Homogeneous and non-homogeneous individuals are considered regarding the players' valuation of the public good.

Date: 2022-07-25
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://inria.hal.science/hal-03947724v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in 19th International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications, Mark Broom, Alberto A. Pinto, Jul 2022, Porto, Portugal

Downloads: (external link)
https://inria.hal.science/hal-03947724v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Positional and conformist effects in public good provision. Strategic interaction and inertia (2023)
Working Paper: Positional and conformist effects in public good provision. Strategic interaction and inertia (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03947724

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().