Fines as enforcers’ rewards or as a transfer to society at large? Evidence on deterrence and enforcement implications

Florian Baumann, Sophie Bienenstock (), Tim Friehe and Maiva Ropaul ()
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Sophie Bienenstock: UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

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Abstract: We analyze experimental data to assess whether the deterrent effect of expected fines depends on who receives the fines' proceeds. We compare behavior in treatments when the revenue is a reward for enforcement agents to the alternative when fines are transferred to society at large. Most important, with a fixed detection probability, potential offenders' material incentives are held constant across treatments. Our evidence suggests that the deterrent effect of expected fines is greater when enforcement agents obtain the fine revenue. Our results also document that the characteristics of enforcers who are willing to incur private costs to create a positive detection probability seem to depend on whether fines reward enforcers or are transferred to society at large.

Date: 2022-10-21
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Published in Public Choice, 2022, ⟨10.1007/s11127-022-01000-5⟩

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Journal Article: Fines as enforcers’ rewards or as a transfer to society at large? Evidence on deterrence and enforcement implications (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03962981

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-022-01000-5

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