Public Opinion on Cartels and Competition Policy in France: Analysis and Implications

Constance Monnier-Schlumberger () and Emmanuel Combe
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Constance Monnier-Schlumberger: UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, PRISM Sorbonne - Pôle de recherche interdisciplinaire en sciences du management - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Emmanuel Combe: UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, PRISM Sorbonne - Pôle de recherche interdisciplinaire en sciences du management - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

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Abstract: In this article, we analyse the foundations, methodology, results and implications of a survey conducted by the French Competition Authority on the perception of cartels and competition policy by general public in France. The results show that French people consider these practices to be harmful and are in favour of dissuasive sanctions. In addition, while not in favour of imposing a prison sentence on individuals, public opinion favours the implementation of criminal sanctions, in particular in the form of disqualification. The results also suggest that cartels are considered to be as serious or more serious breach of the law than other types of fraud. Moreover, French people agree to denounce this practice, but on ethical grounds more than in exchange for a monetary reward. Finally, the French Competition Authority enjoys a certain notoriety, unlike the cartel cases it deals with and despite the amount of sanctions imposed. These empirical results can help to better guide competition policy and enhance its effectiveness.

Date: 2019-09-01
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Published in World Competition, 2019, 42 (Issue 3), pp.335-353. ⟨10.54648/woco2019019⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03967056

DOI: 10.54648/woco2019019

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