Rent-seeking, reform, and conflict: French parliaments at the end of the Old Regime

Touria Jaaidane, Olivier Musy and Ronan Tallec
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Ronan Tallec: LIRAES (URP_ 4470) - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé - UPCité - Université Paris Cité

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Abstract: We analyze the conflict between king Louis XV and the venal office-holders who were members of the French parliaments throughout the eighteenth century. There are contrasting views as to the nature of this confrontation. We consider that the parliaments cooperated with the king as long as their rents were protected. However, they opposed political measures that were likely to harm them. In particular, the introduction of a competing body of civil servants, the intendants, was a major cause of conflict, as they were responsible for the enforcement of reforms that reduced the privileges of office-holders. We propose an analytical narrative of the late French Old Regime and provide an empirical test of our predictions. The data suggest that the political opposition of the French parliaments was primarily a response to the king's reform agenda on matters that would reduce their income and political power.

Keywords: Rent-seeking; Institutional reform; French Old Regime; Parliaments; Venality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-12-21
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Published in Public Choice, 2022, ⟨10.1007/s11127-022-01021-0⟩

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Journal Article: Rent-seeking, reform, and conflict: French parliaments at the end of the Old Regime (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03971443

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-022-01021-0

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