Competition between a manufacturer and a relicensing third party when customers are strategic

Qingyuan Zhu, Chenghao Yu, Zhiyang Shen and Malin Song
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Qingyuan Zhu: College of Economics and Management, Research Center for Soft Energy Science, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing
Chenghao Yu: College of Economics and Management, Research Center for Soft Energy Science, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing
Malin Song: School of Statistics and Applied Mathematics, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu

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Abstract: This study presents an analytical framework for examining how remanufacturing rate, consumer buying behavior, and consumer preferences impact a supply chain's economic and environmental outcomes. An original equipment manufacturer and a third-party remanufacturer make decisions influenced by the competitive leverage of relicensing fees and the maximum available quantity of remanufactured products. We analyze this monopoly scenario in a two-period model, assuming that consumers are strategic. The remanufacturing rate has a nonmonotonic impact on the economic outcomes of this supply chain system, and excellent environmental improvement is not an inevitable consequence of a high remanufacturing rate.

Date: 2023-01-12
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Published in Managerial and Decision Economics, 2023, ⟨10.1002/mde.3798⟩

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Journal Article: Competition between a manufacturer and a relicensing third party when customers are strategic (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03974880

DOI: 10.1002/mde.3798

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