The whys and how of central bank independence: from legal principles to operational accountability

Maqsood Aslam, Etienne Farvaque and Piotr Stanek

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Abstract: This chapter details the founding principles that can explain the drive towards central bank independence, and then looks at the consequences formal independence induces for the communication and understanding of monetary policy. The first part of the chapter examines the principles that have underpinned and stimulated the move towards independent central banks, and explains that these principles can be found in both the economic and legal domains. The second part examines how central banks deal with the accountability, transparency and disclosure requirements that flow from the independence principle itself. If central banks are independent, which constraints does this exerts on the need to communicate and explain monetary policy, to the markets and lay people.

Keywords: Monetary Policy; Independence; Accountability; Communication; Price Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-08-19
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Published in Guillaume Vallet (ed.); Sylvio Kappes (ed.); Louis-Philippe Rochon (ed.). Central Banking, Monetary Policy and Social Responsibility, Chap 3, Edward Elgar Publishing, pp.57-73, 2022, Collection Economics 2022, 9781800372221. ⟨10.4337/9781800372238.00010⟩

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Chapter: The whys and how of central bank independence: from legal principles to operational accountability (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03980529

DOI: 10.4337/9781800372238.00010

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