Accuracy in Public Law Enforcement under Political Competition

Marie Obidzinski

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Abstract: The article investigates the impact of political competition on the level of accuracy in law enforcement. The model looks at the potential distortions implied by political competition relative to the Beckerian benchmark, where a benevolent social planner decides on the resources allocated to accuracy. I show that an elected law enforcer may promote a lower level of accuracy (for crimes inducing moderate harm) or a higher level of accuracy (for crimes inducing extensive harm) than the socially optimal level. Potential extensions are discussed in the last section.

Date: 2019-02
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Published in Supreme Court Economic Review, 2019, 27, pp.195-212. ⟨10.1086/704215⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04035089

DOI: 10.1086/704215

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