Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal
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Eric Rémila: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Date: 2022-05
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Published in Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2022, 43 (4), pp.818-849. ⟨10.1007/s10878-021-00811-4⟩

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Journal Article: Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution (2022)
Working Paper: Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04053211

DOI: 10.1007/s10878-021-00811-4

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