Designing Sanctions

La construction d’une sanction

Julien Pénin () and Marc Deschamps
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Julien Pénin: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Our paper analyzes the design of a sanction without crowding-out motivation. We study a real-life case in which a French city decided to fine parents who pick up their children late in municipal daycare centers. After five months of implementation of this scheme, and contrary to the findings of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a), the number of delays was significantly decreased. We attribute this difference to three specific features of the French city sanction system : i) it was not imposed top-down but designed with the implication of all stakeholders, including parents (involved in a working group) ; ii) communication with parents to justify the fine focused on non-financial elements such as the problems that delays induce for day-care personnel rather than on the financial costs of delays ; iii) the fine is proportional to the length of the delay and to the income of the parents, and it is possible to exclude children from the center in extreme cases.

Date: 2016
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Published in Revue Française d'Economie, 2016, XXXI (2), pp.59-91. ⟨10.3917/rfe.162.0059⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04061572

DOI: 10.3917/rfe.162.0059

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