Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents

Ana Mauleon, Simon Schopohl (), Akylai Taalaibekova () and Vincent Vannetelbosch
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Simon Schopohl: CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain
Akylai Taalaibekova: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Vincent Vannetelbosch: CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain

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Abstract: We study a coordination game on a fixed connected network where players have to choose between two projects. Some players are moderate (i.e. they are ex-ante indifferent between both projects) while others are stubborn (i.e. they always choose the same project). Benefits for moderate players are increasing in the number of neighbors who choose the same project. In addition, players are either farsighted or myopic. Farsighted players anticipate the reactions of others while myopic players do not. We show that, when all players are farsighted, full coordination among the moderate players is reached except if there are stubborn players for both projects. When the population is mixed, the set of stable strategy profiles is a refinement of the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles. In fact, turning myopic players into farsighted ones eliminates gradually the inefficient Nash equilibria. Finally, we consider a social planner who can improve coordination by means of two policy instruments: adding links to the network (socialization) and/or turning myopic players into farsighted ones (education).

Keywords: Networks; Coordination problems; Stubborn players; Farsighted players; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-ppm
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04085258
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Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2022, 51 (3-4), pp.509-536. ⟨10.1007/s00182-021-00802-z⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents (2022)
Working Paper: Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents (2022)
Working Paper: Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents (2022)
Working Paper: Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04085258

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00802-z

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