Stable agreements through liability rules: A multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem

Kevin Techer ()
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Kevin Techer: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Date: 2021-05
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Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2021, 111, pp.77-88. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.003⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04097841

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.003

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