Experience, screening and syndication in venture capital investments

Catherine Casamatta and Carole Haritchabalet ()
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Carole Haritchabalet: CATT - Centre d'Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour

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Abstract: We consider a theoretical model that offers a rationale for the syndication of venture capital investments: syndication improves the screening process of venture capitalists and prevents competition between investors after investment opportunities are disclosed. The analysis identifies the costs of syndication in terms of investment decisions or post-investment involvement of venture capitalists. These costs depend crucially on the level of experience of venture capitalists. The model generates empirical predictions concerning the determinants of syndication and the characteristics of syndicated deals.

Keywords: Venture capital; Syndication; Screening; Experience; Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2007, 16 (3), pp.368-398. ⟨10.1016/j.jfi.2007.03.003⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Experience, screening and syndication in venture capital investments (2007)
Working Paper: Experience, Screening and Syndication in Venture Capital Investments (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04119640

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2007.03.003

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