The distributive liberal social contract as definite norm of communicative action: A characterization through the Nash social welfare function

Jean Mercier Ythier ()
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Jean Mercier Ythier: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas

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Abstract: The distributive liberal social contract sets a norm of communicative action for the allocation and the redistribution of private wealth. It consists in activities that achieve a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources unanimously preferred to a hypothetical status quo. The latter is the allocation of resources that would be obtained in the absence of contract-related activities, under ideal conditions of perfect communication. We provide general sufficient conditions under which any allocation of the social contract maximizes some suitable Nash social welfare function in the set of attainable allocations. We also show that the correspondence between the allocation of the liberal social contract and supporting Nash social welfare functions is bijective if, and in general only if, the distributive preferences of individuals are cardinal. In the latter case, the cooperative solution of Nash extended to any number of individuals provides a definite norm of communicative action for the allocation and the redistribution of private wealth.

Keywords: Communicative action; Nash cooperative solution; Liberal social contract; Redistribution; Contrat social libéral; Action communicative; Solution coopérative de Nash (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Published in Revue de Philosophie Economique / Review of Economic Philosophy, 2021, 21 (1), pp.65-93. ⟨10.3917/rpec.211.0065⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04120422

DOI: 10.3917/rpec.211.0065

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