On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result

Bo Chen, Emilios Galariotis, Lijun Ma, Zijia Wang and Zhaobo Zhu
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Bo Chen: Shenzhen University [Shenzhen]
Emilios Galariotis: Audencia Business School
Lijun Ma: Shenzhen University [Shenzhen]
Zijia Wang: Renming University of China
Zhaobo Zhu: Audencia Business School

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Abstract: This paper examines the effects of disclosing the actual number of participants in innovation contests with endogenous stochastic entry. We model innovation contests as a two-bidder allpay auction with complete information, but in which each bidder has to incur a private cost to participate. The contest organizer observes solvers' participation decisions ex post and can commit ex ante to either fully disclosing or concealing the number of participating solvers. We characterize the equilibrium behavior of the solvers and compare the performances of the disclosure policies by four criteria. We find that full concealment dominates full disclosure in terms of expected total bid and expected winner's bid. Full concealment is dominated by full disclosure in terms of prize allocation efficiency and solvers' welfare. These findings are in sharp contrast to those under exogenous entry.

Keywords: Auctions/bidding; Contest; Crowdsourcing; Stochastic entry; Disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-06-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://audencia.hal.science/hal-04185528
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Published in Annals of Operations Research, 2023, 328 (2), pp.1615 - 1629. ⟨10.1007/s10479-023-05416-0⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04185528

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-023-05416-0

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