Ownership structure and profit maximization in general equilibrium models of monopolistic competition

Vincent Boitier ()
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Vincent Boitier: GAINS - Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux - UM - Le Mans Université

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Abstract: Using Hart (1979, 1985) and Mas-Colell (1984), I defend the idea that the standard ownership structure is somewhat problematic in general equilibrium models of monopolistic competition because profit maximization is not a justified objective of the firm. I then advocate that a solution to overcome this methodological issue is when ownership is disproportionally concentrated among households.

Keywords: Methodological issues; Monopolistic competition; Ownership structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-03-26
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Published in Economics and Business Letters, 2023, 12 (1), pp.85-90. ⟨10.17811/ebl.12.1.2023.85-90⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04204661

DOI: 10.17811/ebl.12.1.2023.85-90

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