Managerial Firms, Taxation, and Welfare

Simone Moriconi

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Abstract: This paper investigates welfare properties of an economy where firms are managerial, i.e., composed of two complementary units, each run by its own manager. We show that welfare outcomes depend on the interplay between the set of private costs and benefits that are associated with the coordination of operating decisions inside the firm. We also derive a number of interesting results regarding the welfare effects of taxation, which depend on market conditions, tax levels, and structure of managerial incentives. In some cases, these welfare effects are due to "tax-induced" changes in the ownership structure of firms in the industry equilibrium.

Keywords: managerial firms; welfare; taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2023, 179 (2), pp.340-380. ⟨10.1628/jite-2023-0030⟩

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Journal Article: Managerial Firms, Taxation, and Welfare (2023)
Working Paper: Managerial Firms, Taxation and Welfare (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04274649

DOI: 10.1628/jite-2023-0030

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