Altruisme familial et dette publique

Stéphane Lambrecht

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Abstract: Family Altruism and Public Debt This paper analyzes the effects of public debt in an overlapping generations model in which individuals behave as altruistic family heads instead of altruistic dynastic funding fathers. The policy properties of this model are halfway between Diamond's [1965] model and Barro's [ 1 974] . A temporary public debt with a maturity included in a generation's life cycle crowds out capital per head whereas it would be neutral with selfish agents. A constant public debt per head crowds out capital per head at any stable stationary equilibrium. But the magnitude of the crowding out is independent of the generational structure of taxes and transfers. The effect of the debt on well-being is positive in the neighbourhood of the golden rule.

Date: 2005
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Published in Revue Française d'Economie, 2005, 19 (3), pp.159-188. ⟨10.3406/rfeco.2005.1556⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04279627

DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.2005.1556

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