Conglomerate dynamics and antitrust policy

Dynamique des conglomérats et politique antitrust

Armel Jacques ()
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Armel Jacques: CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion

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Abstract: Changes in the organisation chosen by groups wishing to engage in collusion practices in several markets are analysed. If the synergies between the different activities are strong, the groups bring together their activities within a conglomerate. Although synergies are weak, the groups prefer to divide their different activities into several autonomous firms when they engage in collusion in several markets. When the competition authority dissolves one of the collusion agreements, the groups merge to combine their activities and benefit from the potential synergies. This dynamic of the group organisation reveals a conglomerate discount.

Keywords: multimarket contacts; competition policy; conglomerate discount; Conglomerates; Conglomérats; collusion; contacts multimarchés; politique de la concurrence; décote de conglomérat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04293751
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2023, 133 (6), pp.997-1038

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04293751

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