Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks (Extended Abstract)

Andrea Canidio and Vincent Danos
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Vincent Danos: DI-ENS - Département d'informatique - ENS-PSL - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We provide a game-theoretic analysis of the problem of front-running attacks. We use it to study a simple commit-reveal protocol and discuss its properties. This protocol has costs because it requires two messages and imposes a delay. However, we show that it prevents the most severe front-running attacks ("bad MEV") while preserving legitimate competition between users, guaranteeing that the earliest transaction in a block belongs to the honest user who values it the most ("good MEV").

Keywords: Front running; Game theory; MEV; Transactions reordering; commit-reveal; Computer systems organization → Dependable and fault-tolerant systems and networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Published in Volume 110, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, pp. 7:1-7:5, 2023, ⟨10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04310265

DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2022.7

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