Cooperative games with types, outside options, and the egalitarian value

Florian Navarro ()
Additional contact information
Florian Navarro: GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This article introduces a new axiom of sub-game order preservation for TUgames as well as a model of cooperative games with types. The axiom, alongside efficiency, characterizes the egalitarian value. The model addresses situations where players of different types are needed. Each player has a specific type and coalitions are feasible only if it contains at most one player of each type. We use the new characterization of the egalitarian value for TU-games to obtain the following result in our class of problems: the egalitarian value is the only sharing rule that ensures that each player of the most productive group is better o joining this most productive group. We characterize the egalitarian value without fairness requirement and show that, for this new class of problems, egalitarianism can provide some form of incentives towards optimal cooperation.

Keywords: Cooperative game theory; shapley value; equal division; egalitarian value; role structure; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-angers.hal.science/hal-04324424v5
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2025, ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.003⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://univ-angers.hal.science/hal-04324424v5/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04324424

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.01.003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().