Does Seller Status Matter in Inter-corporate Asset Sales?

Giang Nguyen and Hai Nguyen
Additional contact information
Giang Nguyen: Waseda University [Tokyo, Japan]
Hai Nguyen: CUHK - The Chinese University of Hong Kong [Hong Kong]

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: "This paper examines the returns of asset acquirers when sellers have different statuses. We find that private sellers create lower returns for acquirers and receive higher premiums than public sellers. Both private equity and private operating sellers generate lower returns for acquirers than public sellers, but their relative gain differences are not significantly different. In addition, the gain difference cannot be explained by acquirer characteristics, sample selection effects, or means of payments, but it increases with sellers' director ownership. We examine alternative theories to explain our results. While we do not find supportive evidence for the synergy creation and information symmetry hypothesis, we find ample evidence for the manager discretion hypothesis."

Keywords: Asset sales; Managerial discretion; Acquirer return; Premium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Banking and Finance, 2019, 100, 97-110 p. ⟨10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.12.017⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04325670

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.12.017

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().