On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer–supplier relationship

José De Sousa () and Xavier Fairise ()
Additional contact information
Xavier Fairise: GAINS - ARGUMANS - Atelier De Recherche En Gestion De L'université Du Mans - GAINS - Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux - UM - Le Mans Université

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Does formal contracting foster cooperation in a buyer–supplier relationship? In line with the literature, we find that a renegotiable contract with relationship-specific joint investments does not make it possible to reach the first-best. However, we show that a renegotiable contract may induce more cooperation than an informal arrangement can. This result may help to understand how cooperation emerges in Japanese procurement practices, which typically involve relationship-specific joint investments and renegotiable contracts.

Keywords: Incomplete contracts; Relationship-specific investments; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08-27
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Economics, 2013, 111 (2), pp.151-171. ⟨10.1007/s00712-013-0360-6⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship (2013)
Working Paper: On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04329719

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-013-0360-6

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().