Evolution and Kantian morality: A correction and addendum

Ingela Alger and Jörgen Weibull

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Abstract: Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (2016, Games and Economic Behavior) consists of two statements. The first establishes that Homo moralis with the right degree of morality is evolutionarily stable. The second statement is a claim about sufficient conditions for other goal functions to be evolutionarily unstable. However, the proof given for that claim presumes that all relevant sets are non-empty, while the hypothesis of the theorem does not guarantee that. We here prove instability under a stronger hypothesis that guarantees existence, and we also establish a new and closely related result. As a by-product, we also obtain an extension of Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (2013, Econometrica).

Keywords: Preference evolution; evolutionary stability; morality; Homo moralis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, 140 (1876), pp.585-587. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.002⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04384501

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.002

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