Cooperation and ethical choices: An experimental study

Serge Blondel and Ngoc Thao Noet ()
Additional contact information
Ngoc Thao Noet: GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: When confronted with choices involving the public good, individuals do not always choose the collective interest. If the ethical choice is a social issue, it is above all a social dilemma. T hrough an experiment in which we study the behavior of 114 subjects, we evaluate the degree of cooperation and explain the factors underlying ethical choices. T he implementation of the prisoners' dilemma and public good games reveals correlation between the amount of the ethical premium and the degree of cooperation. We identify factors that increase this cooperation, such as the frequency of interactions with individuals. T he more cooperative individuals are, the greater the ethical premium. Moreover, individuals naturally seek to cooperate. T he more the game is repeated, the greater the degree of cooperation. Finally, the degree of contribution is lower when individuals anticipate the dilution of the responsibility. So, if we want to generalize ethical choices, we need to pay attention to individual interest in order to increase collective interest.

Keywords: cooperation; ethical values; public good game; prisoners’ dilemma. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Economics Bulletin, inPress

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04388486

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().