The Consequences of Regulating Agency Friction on an Optimal Contract

Vincent Tena
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Vincent Tena: DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Date: 2023-05
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Published in Séminaire du Laboratoire ERUDITE (Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique), May 2023, Créteil, France

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