La relation d’agence au prisme de la (dé)loyauté

Gerard Hirigoyen
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Gerard Hirigoyen: IRGO - Institut de Recherche en Gestion des Organisations - UB - Université de Bordeaux - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Bordeaux

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Abstract: Agency theory in social psychology derives from the experiments of Milgram (1963) seeking to assess the level of obedience to an unethical order. Milgram justifies such behavior by the existence of an agentic state, linked to the integration of the individual into an organizational structure, in which he considers himself the executive agent of a foreign will and renounces rationally weigh the consequences of actions because "being faithful" makes him feel good. The article examines on the one hand, the dangers raised by the excessive loyalty of the agent, and on the other hand, his possible weakening by placing him in a situation of "emissary victim".

Keywords: Agency relationship; Agent Selfishness; Loyalty; Disloyalty; Social psychology; Trust Submission; Soumission; Authority; Principal; Agentic state; Scapegoat; Disengagement; Confiance; Agent; Ègoïsme; Loyauté; Déloyauté; Psychologie sociale; Autorité; Ètat agentique; Bouc émissaire; Désengagement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Published in Revue Française de Gestion, 2023, 49 (310), pp.113-136. ⟨10.3166/rfg310.113-136⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04423782

DOI: 10.3166/rfg310.113-136

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