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Discussion of "the political economy of land reform"

Kenneth Houngbedji

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Abstract: In Benin, top businesspeople not only capture the economy but also the executive, and possibly legislative power. This book develops a comprehensive analysis aimed at identifying and reducing the institutional constraints that impede Benins rapid, sustainable, and inclusive development. The research reveals a chain of causality between four main categories of institutional weaknesses in Benin, namely corruption, inefficiencies in governance, opacity in public decision-making, and excessive informality in the Beninese economy. These institutional weaknesses are traced back to proximate and ultimate causes. The immediate causes include political instability, elite capture of key state functions, weakness of the state, and the possibility of easy but illegal rents. In turn, these causes are linked to deep-rooted underlying factors such as the nature of the political game, essentially neo-patrimonialism with multiple economic and/or political Big Men, but also geographical or ethnic factors. We elaborate on policy reforms aiming at overcoming or circumventing these institutional problems.

Keywords: BENIN (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Published in Bourguignon, F. (ed.); Houssa, R. (ed.); Platteau, J.P. (ed.); Reding, P. (ed.). State capture and rent-seeking in Benin : the institutional diagnostic project, Cambridge University Press, pp.298-303, 2023, 978-1-009-27853-9. ⟨10.1017/9781009278522.016⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04430837

DOI: 10.1017/9781009278522.016

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