Firm-Level Climate Change Risk and CEO Equity Incentives

Ashrafee Hossain, Abdullah‐al Masum, Samir Saadi, Ramzi Benkraiem and Nirmol Das
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Ramzi Benkraiem: Audencia Business School

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Abstract: Abstract We document evidence that CEOs who lead firms that face higher climate change risk (CCR) receive higher equity‐based compensation. Our finding is consistent with the compensating wedge differential theory and survives numerous robustness and endogeneity tests. The result is more prominent for firms that are socially responsible, susceptible to higher environmental litigation and part of the non‐high‐tech industries. Furthermore, we find supportive evidence that firms offering higher equity incentives to their CEOs for managing higher CCR are usually better off in the long run via a lower cost of equity capital and higher firm valuation.

Keywords: Climate change risk; CEO Equity Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04434397
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in British Journal of Management, 2023, 34 (3), pp.1387-1419. ⟨10.1111/1467-8551.12652⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04434397

DOI: 10.1111/1467-8551.12652

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