Les entreprises cibles sont-elles sous-performantes avant l'OPA ?

Ghassen Allani ()
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Ghassen Allani: UPHF - Université Polytechnique Hauts-de-France, LARSH - Laboratoire de Recherche Sociétés & Humanités - UPHF - Université Polytechnique Hauts-de-France - INSA Hauts-De-France - INSA Institut National des Sciences Appliquées Hauts-de-France - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées

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Abstract: This paper provides a detailed examination of the hypothesis of the replacement of inefficient managers associated to the disciplinary motivation of the takeovers. It analyzes the pre-takeovers long term stock return performance using a sample of French tender offer target firms over the period 1985-2002. The analysis also concentrates on subsamples where the takeovers are likely to be disciplinary. As a whole, the disciplinary motivation does not seem a prevalent explanation of the takeovers. However, our results are not inconsistent with idea that some tender offers are carried out to remove poorly performing managers, particularly "friendly bids". These bids, contrary to the hostile bids and with what was advanced by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), are in fact disciplinary offers addressed to inefficient managers, unable to counteract.

Keywords: OPA; OPE; Motivation disciplinaire; Offres hostiles/offres amicales; Remplacement de PDG; Rentabilité anormale sur longue période (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04451829
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Published in Banque & Marchés, 2007, 91, pp.43-57

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