Organization Capital, Tournament Incentives and Firm Performance

Sabri Boubaker, M.M. Hasan and A. Habib
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M.M. Hasan: Macquarie University [Sydney]
A. Habib: Massey University

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Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between organization capital and promotion-based tournament incentives. Using a sample of 33,618 publicly listed U.S. firm-year observations covering 1992\textendash2020, the results show that firms with high levels of organization capital have relatively more promotion-based tournament incentives, and that tournament incentives in high organization capital firms improve firm value and operating performance. \textcopyright 2021 Elsevier Inc.

Keywords: Agency costs; CEO compensation; Organizational capital; Tournament incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://normandie-univ.hal.science/hal-04452668v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Finance Research Letters, 2022, 46, ⟨10.1016/j.frl.2021.102468⟩

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Journal Article: Organization capital, tournament incentives and firm performance (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04452668

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2021.102468

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