Nash Equilibria in Two-Resource Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions

Fatima Khanchouche, Samir Sbabou (), Hatem Smaoui and Abderrahmane Ziad ()
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Fatima Khanchouche: UFAS1 - Université Ferhat-Abbas Sétif 1 [Sétif]
Samir Sbabou: UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université, CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Hatem Smaoui: CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion
Abderrahmane Ziad: UFAS1 - Université Ferhat-Abbas Sétif 1 [Sétif], CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this paper, we examine the class of congestion games with player-specific payoff functions introduced by Milchtaich, I. (1996). Focusing on the special case of two resources, we give a short and simple method for identifying all Nash equilibria in pure strategies. We also provide a computation algorithm based on our theoretical analysis.

Keywords: game theory; Nash equilibria; congestion games; price of anarchy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Published in Games, 2024, Games, 15 (2), pp.7. ⟨10.3390/g15020007⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04506452

DOI: 10.3390/g15020007

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