Effectiveness of the approval mechanism in a three-player common pool resource dilemma

Koffi Serge William Yao, Emmanuelle Lavaine and Marc Willinger
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Koffi Serge William Yao: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier
Emmanuelle Lavaine: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: Selfish players in common pool resources games (CPR) prevent to reach socially efficient outcomes. To solve this CPR dilemma, we investigate further the approval mechanism (AM) in a three-player CPR game. Adding a third player is useful to test the efficiency of approval rules, i.e. majority versus unanimity, in the second stage of the AM. We find that the AM mitigates over-exploitation in three player CPR games, and that unanimity performs better than majority. Nevertheless, with three players, the mechanism surprisingly works better in case of approval failure rather than approval success. However, most approvals are predicted.

Keywords: Approval mechanism; Common pool resources; Unanimity and majority rules; Difference in difference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2024, 109, pp.102179. ⟨10.1016/j.socec.2024.102179⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04530346

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102179

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