Is Amnesty Plus More Successful in Fighting Multimarket Cartels? An Exploratory Analysis

Karine Brisset (), Francois Cochard () and Eve-Angéline Lambert ()
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Karine Brisset: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
Francois Cochard: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
Eve-Angéline Lambert: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: This experiment shows how different levels of fines in three antitrust policies-no leniency (NL), standard leniency (LP), and amnesty plus (AP)-can deter multimarket cartels. With a low fine, AP significantly increases multimarket cartels and leads to higher prices. With a high fine, it has the same effect on collusion as do other policies. With regard to one-market cartels, AP decreases cartel stability relative to LP. With a high fine, it leads to more reporting than does LP, before any investigation and after a first cartel conviction. Higher fines also lead to higher prices in NL and LP, but not higher than in AP.

Keywords: Antitrust; Multimarket cartels; Leniency programs; Leniency plus; Price competition with differentiated products (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09-12
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Published in Review of Industrial Organization, 2023, 63 (2), pp.211-237. ⟨10.1007/s11151-023-09919-9⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04532585

DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09919-9

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