Comparing real and hypothetical incentives in giving and money burning experiments

David Masclet () and Therese Rebiere
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David Masclet: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper examines experimentally how social and anti-social decisions respond to hypothetical or real incentives. Our experiment consists of three games: i) a Modified Dictator Game, ii) a Money Giving Game, and iii) a Money Burning Game. Although we find different size effects (quantitative differences) across treatments, our data indicate very similar directional changes (qualitative similarities) relative to initial endowment distribution and the price of the decision. These findings suggest that if we are mainly interested in qualitative (directional) findings, then using hypothetical incentives may be relevant and considered as a diluted version of the real ones.

Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2023, 152, pp.65. ⟨10.2307/48754785⟩

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Journal Article: Comparing Real and Hypothetical Incentives in Giving and Money Burning Experiments (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04534560

DOI: 10.2307/48754785

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