The role of mediators in compensation negotiations between gainers and losers

Jean-Christophe Pereau
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Jean-Christophe Pereau: BSE - Bordeaux Sciences Economiques - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This article aims at modelling compensation between gainers and losers as a system of bilateral bargaining games involving one or two mediators when unanimity is required for the implementation of an economic policy. Results show that there is no unanimity on the choice of negotiation protocol due to the conflicting interests between gainers and losers. But if we assume that the mediators have the choice of the protocol, they always prefer simultaneous rather than stackeberg Nash-in-Nash negotiations.

Keywords: Nash-in-Nash negotiation; Nash bargaining solution; Gainers; Losers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-06-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Published in Economics Bulletin, 2023, 43 (2), pp.830-841

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