Smuggling of forced migrants to Europe: a matching model

Olivier Charlot, Claire Naiditch and Radu Vranceanu

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper develops a matching model to analyze the smuggling market for forced migrants, building on the empirical evidence related to the smuggling of migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Middle East to Europe in the last decade. Comparative statics for the equilibrium solution reveal that coercion-based measures targeting the smugglers reduce the number of irregular migrants and smugglers at the expense of migrants' overall welfare. Slightly increasing legal migration opportunities has the interesting feature of reducing irregular flows, without deteriorating migrants' welfare or increasing the total number of migrants. An extremely restrictive asylum policy has similar effects in terms of the flows of irregular migrants as a quite loose one, with the largest flows of irregular migrants occurring under a "middle-range" policy.

Keywords: Migrant smuggling; Irregular migration; Forced migration; Matching model; Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02-14
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Population Economics, 2024, 37 (1), pp.18. ⟨10.1007/s00148-024-00993-1⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Smuggling of forced migrants to Europe: a matching model (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04551058

DOI: 10.1007/s00148-024-00993-1

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().