Sharing cost of network among users with differentiated willingness to pay

Elena Panova ()
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Elena Panova: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a fixed tree-network among users with differentiated willingness to pay for the good supplied through the network. We find that the associated value-sharing problem is convex, hence, the core is large and we axiomatize a new, computationally simple core selection based on the idea of proportionality.

Keywords: Sharing network cost; Core; Proportional allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-dcm, nep-env and nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04556220v1
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, 142, pp.666-689. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.009⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04556220

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.009

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