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How to Reduce Post-Harvest Losses ? A Theoretical Assessment of a Support Policy versus a Regulation Policy

Comment réduire les pertes post-récolte ? Une évaluation théorique d’une politique de soutien versus une politique de régulation

Lamia Meziani, Abdelhakim Hammoudi (), Mohammed Said Radjef and Maria Angela Perito
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Lamia Meziani: Unité de recherche LaMOS = Research unit LaMOS - Unité de recherche Laboratoire de Modélisation et Optimisation des Systèmes [Université de Béjaïa] - UB - Université Abderrahmane Mira [Université de Béjaïa] = University of Béjaïa = جامعة بجاية
Abdelhakim Hammoudi: UMR PSAE - Paris-Saclay Applied Economics - AgroParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Mohammed Said Radjef: Unité de recherche LaMOS = Research unit LaMOS - Unité de recherche Laboratoire de Modélisation et Optimisation des Systèmes [Université de Béjaïa] - UB - Université Abderrahmane Mira [Université de Béjaïa] = University of Béjaïa = جامعة بجاية
Maria Angela Perito: UniTE - Università degli Studi di Teramo

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Abstract: The article analyzes two public policies implemented to reduce postharvest food losses : a policy based on a minimum logistics standard (MLS) imposed on producers and a policy based on subsidizing producer logistics. We propose a model of spatial differentiation where producers of perishable products are geographically located and more or less distant from a wholesale market. We assess different effects of these policies : direct effects (on food losses) and " collateral " effects (on prices and on the exclusion of producers). Compared to the situation without public intervention, the imposition of an MLS only improves the infrastructure of the producers closest to the market while a public subsidy is more effective at improving the infrastructure of producers farthest from the market. We show that public authorities may face a dilemma : i) choose an MLS that is more efficient at reducing the risk of food loss but with more negative effects on the inclusion of producers and on social well-being ; ii) choose a subsidy policy that is less effective at reducing food losses but (if the level is not too high) with more positive externalities on the other criteria.

Keywords: Spatial competition; Food loss; Minimum logistics standard; Logistics subsidy; Exclusion; Social welfare; Concurrence spatiale; Perte alimentaire; Norme logistique minimale; Subvention logistique; Bien être social (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02-26
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2024, Vol. 134 (1), pp.49-80. ⟨10.3917/redp.341.0049⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04561265

DOI: 10.3917/redp.341.0049

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