A Strategic Model of Polytheism

Laurent Gauthier (laurent.o.gauthier@gmail.com)
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Laurent Gauthier: LED - Laboratoire d'Economie Dionysien - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis, CAC-IXXI, Complex Systems Institute, ESPRI - Espace, Pratiques sociales et Images dans les mondes Grec et Romain - ArScAn - Archéologies et Sciences de l'Antiquité - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - MCC - Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We consider a formal model of polytheistic religion, where worshippers choose gods to address, and expect benefits in return. At the game-theoretic equilibrium, they choose gods optimally depending on how the gods return favors, as a function of divine efficiency. This efficiency can be modeled based on a random growth model of prayer benefit, and results in worship acts following power laws. A reduction in the range of random events associated to the various divinities, or to their range of interpretations, leads to more concentration of worship towards less divinities.

Keywords: Polytheism; Theory of religious economy; Game theory; Random growth models; Power laws (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-10-10
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Published in Rationality and Society, 2024, 36 (4), pp.480-501. ⟨10.1177/10434631241269525⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04624416

DOI: 10.1177/10434631241269525

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