Dynamics of influence within the audit regulatory space: Role-playing and the rise of cynicism

Géraldine Hottegindre (), Marie-Claire Loison () and Loïc Belze
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Géraldine Hottegindre: EM - EMLyon Business School
Marie-Claire Loison: EM - EMLyon Business School
Loïc Belze: EM - EMLyon Business School

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Abstract: The European Commission (EC) conducted a major reform of statutory audit between 2010 and 2014, with the primary aim of improving competition in the market. The Big 4, who were targeted by this reform, were strongly opposed to it. The present study employs the typology of Oliver (1991) and the "presentation of self" theory developed by Goffman (1956) to identify the strategic responses employed, frontstage and backstage, by the regulator (EC) and the regulatees (Big 4) to influence the outcome of the reform. The results reveal that passive strategic responses tend to take place frontstage, while active and aggressive strategies generally take place backstage. This work also reveals the incursion of the neoliberal model into the European regulatory arena, and allows us to characterize the Big 4 as cynical actors defending a commercial logic.

Keywords: Audit; Strategic responses; Frontstage; Backstage; Big 4; European Commission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12-01
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Published in Critical Perspectives On Accounting, 2024, 100, ⟨10.1016/j.cpa.2024.102743⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04665205

DOI: 10.1016/j.cpa.2024.102743

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