Rights and obligations in Cambridge social ontology

Yannick Slade-Caffarel ()
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Yannick Slade-Caffarel: PHARE - Philosophie, Histoire et Analyse des Représentations Économiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, King‘s College London

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Abstract: Rights and obligations—sometimes referred to as deontology or deontic powers—are key to most contemporary conceptions of social ontology. Both Cambridge Social Ontology and the dominant analytic conception associated, most prominently, with John Searle, place rights and obligations at the centre of their accounts. Such a common emphasis has led some to consider deontology to be a point of similarity between these different theories. This is a mistake. In this paper, I show that a distinctive conception of rights and obligations underpins Cambridge Social Ontology and its social positioning theory. Moreover, I argue that a fuller understanding of the account of rights and obligations defended in Cambridge in fact reveals that it can be differentiated from other conceptions and, most importantly, Searle's, by its recognition that a practical dimension is always involved in social constitution.

Keywords: Collective acceptance; Collective practice; Deontology; Practical dimension; Rights and obligations; Social ontology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01-03
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Published in Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 2022, 52 (2), pp.392-410. ⟨10.1111/jtsb.12332⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04711049

DOI: 10.1111/jtsb.12332

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